When the state loots the shareholder

State-sanctioned looting of shareholders becomes the norm in the United Kingdom. First not-so-gentle persuasion was used to force banks to compensate 'victims of mis-selling' (though how these millions were forced to buy products that they were not supposed to either want or need still is beyond me). Then all those who were at the loosing end of derivative contracts that were designed to protect them against interest rate risk were out with their begging bowls and a complicit media commentariat, lobbyists and politicians jumped on the bandwagon to punish the unloved banking sector. The latest illustration of madcap regulatory overreach is given today as the UK's FSA fines Prudential Plc 30 (in words: thirty!!!) million pounds on the spurious pretext of not having been informed in time about a possible bid for AIA. The shareholders and pensioners who are paying for this nonsense will be the ones picking up the bill that feeds the ever-rising army of paper-pushers in the regulatory Gulag that slowly strangles the financial industry in the UK - no need for the 'Troika' to aid an inept government of PR luvies.

Europe's banks face gaping capital hole says EBA

When the EBA states that many banks would have insufficient core capital under the rules that will come into force we are not surprised. As we repeatedly said, no amount of capital will ever make banks 100 percent bulletproof. One just has to make more and more pessimistic assumptions and come to the conclusion that a bank is not 'safe' enough. The only way to get the taxpayer off the hook once and for all would be the introduction of limited purpose banking as suggested by Larry Kotlikoff.

Political pressure to prevent CDS on Greece to pay out?

The example of a minor Austrian bank demonstrates the potential fallout that can be expected if CDS sellers are required to pay out in case Greece is 'officially' (by the insider-dominated ISDA committee) declared to be in default. Kommunalkreditbank - already rescued by the Austrian government - could be required to pay out in the high hundreds of millions of Euros if it is required to pay out on the CDS contracts it has sold. One has to assume that the Austrian government - and quite a few others - are not too keen to see the ISDA committee to declare that a credit event means that CDS contracts have to be paid out. Who will be brave enough to sue the Committee? Don't expect any help from the regulators - they are in the pockets of politicians who probably snigger about the fact that the CDS market has been little less than a game like the many online games - a financial markets farmville.
"Since when is a country's defaulting on its debt not a credit event?" asks Alan Abelson (Barron's)

Fair play in Bank Bailouts

The sorry saga surrounding the Bailout of major financial institutions during the banking crisis of 2008 should teach regulators and politicians one lesson: by all means support banks in such a crisis but make sure you seize full control from shareholders in such a situation. As staff - and particular senior management - hold large stakes in the equity of these concerns that would also impose somewhat more meaningful penalties on them than the odd slap on the wrist we have seen during the past few years. And institutional shareholders maybe would finally wake up from their slumber and take their ownership roles more seriously - rather than just darting in and out of equity positions as if they would be just play a game of monopoly with their investor's money.

What should be the right level of Margin?

An article in today's Financial Times bemoans the shrinking level of collateral and gives the impression that this would be something to be concerned about - rather than give an indication that the financial system is on the way to a more sensible future. Haircuts or Margins are still way below levels required if prudent standards would be applied. As I said from long before the 2007-2009 credit crisis they should allow for one-day moves in asset prices of as much as 30 percent.  This would of course drastically reduce the overall volume of speculative and risk positions and therefore make it much less likely that price moves of such a magnitude would happen.

Dexia troubles - no surprise given waferthin capital cushion

One glance at the balance sheet of the troubled lender makes it all-too-obvious what is at the heart of the banking crisis: equity capital is just not large enough to support the huge balance sheets that happy-go-lucky bank managements have piled up in the good times. At the end of 2010 total equity of Euro 8.945 billion had to support assets in the amount of 567 billion Euros! Add the fact that many bank balance sheets are financed with footloose 'hot money' and are not even closely matching maturities on the asset and liability side and you have the perfect prescription for a banking shipwreck. And all that under the 'watchful' eye of the regulators.

OTC Derivatives - a dangerous house of cards?

The renewed crisis in the credit markets that has been triggered by concerns about peripheral member states of the Eurozone festers like a slow-burning bush fire. As we have warned before, the regulators and politicians have still not come up with a credible solution (we avoid the expression 'final solution' but that is what the financial markets would really need).
Case in point is the concern about the gigantic gross exposures that nestle within the financial markets - and the extreme level of risk concentration that does little to assuage concerns. No one can really predict what would happen if there is a new bout of extreme market volatility - if key variables like stock markets would move by 20 per cent of more in one day. At a time when markets get excited about wholly inadequate hikes in margin requirements for gold futures for example one has to assume that drastic moves would take the majority of market participants by surprise.
A simple remedy - no PhD's required, or expensive 'accountant.consultants' - would be the introduction of meaningful margin and capital requirements for ALL derivative contracts that are on the books of any bank, fund manager or other counter party.

CDS Death Spiral in full swing again

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/09/30/689791/le-spleen-de-morgan-stanley/

If you learn nothing from history, you are bound to repeat the mistakes of the past - the horror story of uncontrolled short selling via an easily manipulated CDS market is creating havoc again. Basically the rising spreads are nothing else but a concerted effort to create a run on banks and countries. We warned about this repeatedly during the 2008-09 crash but regulators and politicians have not heeded the warnings, now they reap the whirlwind.

CDS trading still poses danger to financial stability

During the height of the Credit Crunch we have repeatedly warned about the dangers of a self-feeding spiral that could destabilise companies and banks in particular. Nothing has been learned and the market's attack on Bankamerica seems to become a repeat performance of the chaos that was allowed to dominate the markets back then.

CDS - Why not prohibit states issuing debt?

When a professional party politician like the MEP Markus Ferber (he is a charge on Europe's citizens since the tender age of 29!) states that prohibiting uncovered CDSs on government bonds is under serious consideration we see that one thing is certainly represented in the useless European Parliament: ignorance about financial markets! I am critical of Credit Derivatives for a number of reasons as this blog documents but prohibition by the EU and/or its member states would simply drive the business to friendlier shores. The flood of government paper in itself is a sort of uncovered short sale that can only be described as a Ponzi scheme. As the debt level inexorably rises towards a tipping point - close to or above 100 percent of GDP - the political class that is addicted to buy votes by spending other people's money becomes increasingly desperate in the search for ways to extend its spending spree a little further - at least beyond the next election.

Central Clearing: Solution or Problem?

Pushing more business onto central clearing systems is not the ultimate solution in the search for a more stable financial system. The question remains the same: Would the system be able to deal with a (near instantaneous) change of 20 or 30 pct of asset prices? Only then could one be reasonably sure that a market panic could not topple the financial system. But that would require a substantial increase in margin rates and a corresponding reduction in the amount of leverage available to all market participants.

Tulips anyone?

That comes to mind when reading about the frenzied trading in today's story stocks such as Facebook, Twitter and Linkedin. Which bank will it be that is left holding the bag financing a speculative hot-shot when the whole bubble bursts?

Deutsche Bank: rated most exposed by Japanese Regulator

While Deutsche Bank has performed admirably (at least on a comparative basis) during the financial Crash we kept being concerned about the slender margin of safety that is provided by the equity capital basis. DB may be less exposed to sovereign loans in the Eurozone and corporate loans may also be a lower part of its portfolio than in other institutions but that means that the bank is more exposed to financial assets and counter party credits. And the purchase of supposedly 'safe' businesses such as Deutsche Postbank and Oppenheim are by no means guaranteed to provide the high returns that management continues to aim for. News that Deutsche Bank is the lucky (?) owner of the most recent addition to the Las Vegas hotel scene does little to inspire confidence in the bank's risk management skills. Maybe the bank should pay its bonuses in the form of free hotel vouchers until the full extent of its exposure has been recouped.

Secretive Banking Elite rules Trading in Derivatives?

A New York Times report highlights the lack of official supervision of trading in derivatives. In no industry would it be allowed that the dominating participants collude setting market rules without being subject to impartial outside regulation - be it from consumers or government authorities. When the market in OTC derivatives started it was a tiny cottage industry and supervision was unnecessary. Now the amounts involved are so enormous - multiples of the whole planet's GDP - that leaving the task of supervision to a few market insiders is no longer practical. One can only hope that the top officials of the financial firms concerned realize that - in the interest of society as well as their own - a new regulatory framework is urgently required. Putting the majority of the trading onto exchanges will alleviate the risks of a catastrophic market failure but this will in itself not be enough. The central clearing houses in turn will have to be made as secure as possible and only a substantial increase in margin that has to be posted by ALL market participants will ensure a safe market environment.

Lehman bankruptcy administration costs reach $1 billion mark

Regulators worldwide can be congratulated for contributing so generously to the fortunes of lawyers, accountants and assorted advisers who reap this windfall at the expense of savers and investors. A special thank you must be reserved for Hank Paulson was instrumental in orchestrating this signature disaster during the Credit Crunch.

Scandal of Lehman Bankruptcy Costs

The spiralling costs of related to the resolution of the 2008 Lehman bankruptcy can only be described as scandalous. Rather than worrying about how to make life for the banking and investing industry more difficult the regulators (in most countries) should pay attention to this little understood corner of the financial world. Similar abuse goes unchecked in ordinary bankruptcies as well were suppliers or creditors get short shrift from a dysfunctional and inbred community of 'bankruptcy professionals'. Assuming the average overall cost of a professional should be around $300,000 the costs that have been run up in the Lehman case so far ($982 million) would pay for the services of an army of just under 2000 professionals working exclusively on this case during the past 2 years. Any money squandered during this process leave investors worldwide out of pocket and therefore this is no game where no one is losing out. Where are legislators, regulators, the media or the corporate governance tribes to check the efficacy of the endless hours billed or the rates charged?

A distorted view of the banking crisis

The standard of public discourse in the United States reaches a new low when respected commentators can argue that the main culprits in the crisis that hit the US financial system were the politicians in Washington. If one wants to one can argue that EVERY citizen and institution was culpable, be they lenders, borrowers, investors, voters etc. But to pin the majority of the blame on Washington goes to far. No one ordered Dick Fuld to manage the affairs of Lehman Brothers the way he did, nor can this argument be an excuse for the egregious failure of Bear Stearns' management to see the danger signs flashing all around them - while they were happy to spend time on the golf course or playing bridge.

Banking: Maturity Mismatch continues

Reports about increasing levels of stress in bank funding should surprise no one. One of the key lessons - if not THE key lesson - of the Credit Crunch should have been that the Banking System was in need of a complete overhaul of the liability structure. Financing long-term assets and loans with shorter-dated liabilities may have worked in the days of sedate financial and economic structures in the period after WWII up to the 1980s. But an existence relying on hand-to-mouth feeding of liquidity from deposits that are for periods of days, weeks or even months was - and is - a recipe for disaster. Money Market Funds feed the illusion of liquidity on the asset side and are a further contributing factor to this asset-liability mismatch as is the enormous amount of commercial paper rolled over by companies as well as financial institutions. 

Dubai debt settlement leaves sour taste

With members states of the UAE sitting on reserves and investments worth hundreds of billions it is - to say the least- astounding that there is not enough money to pay off the contractors and creditors in one fell swoop. Do the 'authorities' think that this will increase their credibility (or do they need the money for urgent purchases of new race horses?). On a more serious note this is just another nail in the coffin of the internationalisation of bank lending. Closer to home the idea that lending to governments - at home or abroad - is a safe bet is being tested to the limit. It may well be a good idea to leave lending to governments to private and institutional investors. Why should it require the insertion of a bank balance sheet to fund government spending? This just increases balance sheet risk rather than remove it from the banking system. If governments become bankrupt the value of the outstanding bonds will decline in value and allow an orderly resolution of the situation via a reorganisation of debt.

Hedge Fund Wolves destroyed Bear Stearns?

The controversy about the role hedge funds have played - and may continue to play - in the credit and economic crisis that has erupted in 2007 can only be settled by an open and forensic analysis of all transactions entered by hedge funds during the period. All other discussions are based on guesswork, innuendo or comments from enemies or supporters of the industry with an axe to grind.