Fraud Prevention - Banks walk on thin Ice

News that a subsidiary of Nord LB (Norddeutsche Landesbank) in Switzerland may have fallen victim to a fraud in its trade finance activities that may cost it up to Euro 130 million is a timely reminder that banking is a hazardous business where a premium should be put on credit and operational supervision and due diligence. All-too-often senior management is preoccupied with 'strategy' or political infighting and pays little or no attention to what is going on further down in the organisation or in outposts of a far-flung (overextended?) empire.

BNP Paribas Compensation: A Model to follow?

BNP states that is will reduce its compensation-to-income ratio to 27 per cent for FY 2009. In doing so management claims to address public (political) concerns over excessive pay. BNP certainly seems to navigate successfully through the twin challenges of keeping regulators sweet and running the business smoothly while competitors stumble over PR gaffes or management mistakes. However, we do have a sneaking suspicion that pressure on compensation levels in the large investment banks will contribute to a revival of smaller competitors that are not in the limelight and are less subject to regulatory fervor.

Goldman Sachs Business Principles

We still have the last edition of Goldman's phone directory that we received before moving on.

Point 1 states: Out clients' interests always come first. Our experience shows that if we serve our clients well, our own success will follow.

Point 2: Our assets are people, capital and reputation. If any of these are ever lost, the last is the most difficult to regain.

We hope that these points still feature prominently in the phone directory (which by now will probably be in electronic form only).

Greece: Why not declaring bankruptcy?

Martin Feldstein's piece in yesterday's Financial Times (Let Greece take a holiday from the Eurozone) caused us to send him a brief note and we will watch the reply of the sage with interest:

Dear Mr. Feldstein!

Your article - like most other articles concerning the Greek Debt Saga - tacitly assumes that one simple way to solve the problem is not feasible: a declaration of bancruptcy and subsequent resolution comparable to Chapter XI in the USA.

At present, the only two options that are being discussed are (1) a bailout by EU member states or (2) Greece leaving the Eurozone. Eliminating the option of bancruptcy from consideration creates an unproductive stalemate between two diametrically opposed viewpoints (aften aggravated by different ideologies regarding the philosophy behind the creation of the Euro).

Harmonised Stress Tests - Good in Theory

CEIOPS plans to introduce a harmonised stress test for Insurance companies in Europe. While this is a worthwhile project it will create one practical problem: what amount of stress will be applied to the balance sheets of the insurers? Well before the Credit Crunch started in the middle of 2007 we often asked the question: What would happen in the hypothetical case that all asset prices drop 20 per cent? would the banking and financial system in general be able to withstand such a shock - given that the margin of safety on a lot of lending was much less than that! We all know the answer to that question and I think that lessons still have not been learned. The problem is, that only by relying less on debt and debt instruments (in any form) and more on equity will the risk of a financial meltdown be successfully contained. Regulators will be hard-pressed to set the appropriate level of 'stress' in any test - too much and they regulate the insurance industry out of business, too little and the test becomes meaningless.

Barclays Results - how good?

We are not running a financial research business but every so often we are tempted to comment on a company result when we can use it to pinpoint some interesting development in our patch - banking, securities and money management. The one detail that caught our interest in the Barclays results was the fact that actual return on shareholder's equity seems to be below the 10 per cent mark. While this is a respectable number - is has been produced during the second part of the Credit Crunch at a time when the sizable Lehman USA acquisition had to be digested - it puts into perspective the fact that the banking giants produce headline catching numbers (total compensation paid out, profits earned) but this has to be seen in proper perspective. Making that kind of return with a lot of tailwind from financial markets and ultra-cheap central bank money is no superhuman feat. Any new costly regulation may well put downward pressure on banking profitability in the future.

Greece: Banks and Hedge Funds must watch out

The present crisis in and about Greece may look like a god-sent opportunity to make money but banks and hedge funds must be careful not to take too high a profile. Speculation against the Euro and Greece may well backfire if it turbo-charges downward pressure on the Euro and Greek bonds. The days when speculation was a cottage industry and could be ignored are long a thing of the past. Speculative moves do not reflect reality but they actually CREATE reality (a thankful nod to George Soros' theory of reflexifity). So this is not a harmless crap game but the lives of millions of citizens are at stake - and they will not tolerate for ever that a few make millions on the back of ordinary working people. Recent criticism (James Rickards in last week's Financial Times and today's Neue Zuercher Zeitung) pointed the finger at Goldman Sachs. But its competitors should not gloat but may well find themselves in the firing line as well. The New York Times points out that the same investment banks that now point the finger at Greek profligacy when they issue their research reports were more than willing to lead the country deeper into the debt trap. Can you really have it both ways? Even with the help of God?

Bank Tax: Brown barking up the wrong tree

When statists sniff an opportunity to extract more tax from their subjects they usually find an excuse quite quickly. Gordon Brown certainly thinks that the solution to all of our problems is to invent a new tax. So it is no wonder that taxing banks is his solution to the global credit crunch. How that is supposed to absolve us from problems such as excessive borrowing, mismatch of maturities in balance sheets or simply bad lending is not explained to the public. In addition we have to expect the worst when it comes to disposal of the loot: will the tax money end up in some sort of reserve fund? or is it a pay-as-you-go scheme like the national 'insurance' or unemployment 'insurance' schemes that we are so familiar with?

EU Alternative Asset Management Regulation

The present plan to regulate the alternative asset management industry in the EU suffers from a number of serious deficiencies: Number one is the lack of a definition of the problem that it is supposed to solve. If there is no problem it is quite tough to design a proper regulatory regime. As far as we can see, apart from the usual rant from social engineers to the left (but also the authoritarians on the right) of the political divide there has not been a convincing proof that hedge funds or private equity funds pose a serious problem to anyone individually or to 'society' in general. So we are left with a legislative 'free-for-all' that gives underemployed and overpaid bureaucrats that represent no one but themselves (and their prejudices) carte blanche to cook up more schemes to make it difficult for ordinary citizens to make a living. As there is no clearly defined problem in the first place it is impossible to pass judgement whether or not the proposed measures are appropriate - an ideal world for the legislators as no one can call them to account or do a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed legislation. (As if anyone would to that in Brussels or any other capital). On the most basic level a major criticism has to be that it is not sensible to regulate hedge funds and private equity funds in the same law. They are similar in nature but it takes a bit of experience to understand that they are two very different animals. We rest our case as it is impossible to convince the average EU bureaucrat that he is barking up the wrong tree. Better to prepare for the wholesale decampment of the alternative investing industry to friendlier shores!

UK: is regulation 'clinically insane'?

The regulation may not be clinically insane (as per Jon Moulton) but it certainly requires a special individual to be able to find one's way through the thousand plus pages of the assorted rules and regulations passed by the FSA. One wonders how many of its staff would pass an exam that tests them about detailed knowledge of all the rules, - we would take bets that the present chairman would not be able to pass the exam. We do not even want to get into the question of democratic accountability as the British Parliament is not fit for the purpose it is designed for. There is no 'talk' (french: parler) as the stooges peopling its benches are basically told what to nod through by the government.