Bawag - problems of Private Equity or Hedge Fund Control

The diffuse ownership structure of the Austrian BAWAG Bank - where an alternative fund management firm has orchestrated a buy-out consortium a few years ago - is an apt illustration of the problems created by allowing alternative asset managers to control banking institutions. Apart from the fact that the financing often is debt-heavy there is the potential risk that conflicts of interest are not controlled properly. The age-old temptation of using a banking institution to supply credit on easy terms to controlling shareholders is one of the key areas that banking regulators have to focus on. There is also a potential conflict of interest when other banks (Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers in this case) are shareholders in competing institutions.

Barclays objects to Lehman scrutiny

Barclays Bank is on a roll and it therefore seems strange when the firm is reported to object to further disclosures concerning its takeover of the US operations of Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008. This behaviour will only encourage critics and runs contrary to our advice that full disclosure it the best public relations strategy.

Stability Fund no magic solution for Banking System

Germany seems to move closer to implementing some sort of stability fund for the banking sector. But its promoters already admit that the state (taxpayer) will still have to provide a backstop even in a situation when a fund is in existence. We would agree as the fund would have to be of enormous size if it ever would be able to provide for any crisis. Ironically a similar (simpler?) solution would be for banks to hold more capital reserves - which would effectively be an in-house contingency fund at every institution. Suggestions that other sectors (such as insurance) should also contribute to the fund are based on the argument that they have benefited from the bailout provided by the taxpayer. Now where does this argument end?

Lehman: Masters of the Universe R.I.P.

The sense of hubris that was prevalent at Lehman Brothers before the fall is well documented in a new book The Devil’s Casino: Friendship, Betrayal and the High Stakes Games Played Inside Lehman Brothers, by Vicky Ward. It mentions that one of the top honchos in the firm, Chris Pettit, got by with a personal spending budget of $ 15 million (!!) a year. With leadership of that kind it is no surprise that the company had to hit the rocks sooner or later. The question one has to ask is what lessons - if any - has the securities industry from the credit crunch?

Repo transactions under a cloud

Reports that Lehman relied heavily on repo transactions in order to disguise problems with its balance sheet highlight the need for tighter restrictions on repo's. Like commercial paper, most repo deals are short-term in nature and therefore unsuited for the financing of longer-term assets. Funding based on repo's, commercial paper and similar instruments should be used exclusively for the financing of assets with a matching maturity profile and capital requirements should allow for a sufficient margin to provide for extreme events.

Geithner intervenes in EU hedge fund regulation

One has to wonder what Tim Geithner's priorities are at a time when the USA faces an unprecedented gap in its budget and the economy has just left the intensive-care ward. The USA puts massive restrictions on foreign fund managers that try to market their services or securities to its citizens, the boilerplate restrictions on most securities prospectuses and fund manager's brochures and websites bear witness to that. Why should the EU not have the right to protect its citizens? Any non-EU fund manager is welcome to set up a EU-compliant subsidiary and thus get access to a market of 500 million people.

Causes of the global credit crunch

It is too early to fully understand how it could happen that the World's Financial System got close to a global meltdown during the past 12 months. Some blame greedy bankers, others lay the blame squarely at the foot of the (US) consumers. Institutional Investors also appear entangled as they allowed managements too much leeway and even egged them on to pursue ever-more risky expansion plans. However, we tend to think that regulators - and their paymasters the politicians - may have to take a large part of the blame.
Unfortunately they are the party that is the least likely to bear the full cost of their mistakes. Shareholders have to suffer from dramatically shrunken share prices, scores of bankers have lost their jobs, or are about to in the near future. Bureaucrats are happily engaged in the blame game and are joined by academics and media people who often are also less than objective in their judgement.

FSA wants tougher stress tests

As the FSA here in Britain announces new - tougher - stress markers for UK banks we can only hope that the underlying economic model holds up in case another economic crisis hits the banking system. We all know what happened to the Value-at-Risk Model - it was less than useful when it was needed most. The problem with stress-tests in banking is that it is impossible for the banking system as it is at present to provide for every conceivable disaster scenario as that would mean that ultimately the banks would have to hold all deposits 100 per cent in cash.

Lower Leverage-ratio under fire

The Federation of German banks has commissioned a study of the impact of stricter leverage ratios. Not surprisingly, the authors (Markus Rudolf and Michael Frenkel from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management) come to the conclusion that the introduction of lower ratios would have to be handled very carefully - and may not even be desirable. To the contrary, we think that the suggested ratio of 20-25 times equity capital as a maximum range of leverage (as suggested in a consultation document presented by the Bale Committee last December) leaves the banking system still dangerously overextended.

Who needs rating agencies?

Warren Buffet certainly does not need them as he prefers to do his own analysis. We also suggest that investors do their own cooking. The only instances that makes ratings useful for investment decisions happen to be the situations where the consensus and/or ratings appear to cause a mispricing in the underlying security that allows a canny investor to benefit by taking the opposite side of the trade. As long as ratings are based on hard facts, usually numbers found in company accounts or data in national statistics, it is a simple matter of arithmetic to deduce the risk associated with a particular issuer. Where ratings rely on judgement calls they become highly subjective and should not be worth more than any other market opinion. Conflicts of interest exist when ratings agencies are given access to non-public information. As it is not possible for other investors to verify the information themselves, some lazy or naive investors get seduced to put excessive reliance on ratings decisions. This risk is exacerbated when laws or customs give ratings an official blessing - for example by requiring collateral posted with the European Central Bank to be of a certain credit quality testified by a rating.