What is socially useful work?

Topical opportunity for Adair Turner, Chairman of the FSA here in London to clarify his exacting standards with respect to what is or is not 'socially useful work': is sitting on a sofa and 'reading' the breakfast news socially useful work? This is the question we ask ourselves as the BBC's Adrian Chiles is signed by ITV for a reported £6million.

Glass Steagall is good for you!

We continue to be amazed by the hysteric reaction of bankers to the possible introduction of a separation of business lines along the regulations imposed by the defunct Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 that separated commercial and investment banking for more than sixty years in the USA. Looking at it from another perspective - and not just short term/short sighted business perspectives - was the global success and dominance of the US investment banks not partially due to this enforced separation? Would the enterprise spirit not have been severely dented by keeping the entrepreneurial spirit constrained by the bureaucratic management structures of the commercial banks? A similar argument could be made in case of the City of London where the free-wheeling spirit of the financial community goes back over centuries and is in stark contrast to the top-down models of the continental European banking industry.

Dick Fuld's Ignorance: argument for smaller Banks

When the former CEO of Lehman Brothers argues that he had no knowledge of the bank's use of an accounting gimmick to hide its deteriorating financial situation we may well give him the benefit of the doubt in the absence of a 'smoking gun' proving the opposite. But it also demonstrates that even managing a financial firm such as Lehman Brothers was beyond the capability of one manager. Lehman did not have all the other business units that the typical 'Universal' Bank has under its wings (Credit Card, Consumer loans, Corporate Banking to name a few) and it still was possible that the man in command - and given his length of tenure he had the ability to know the shop inside out - did not get involved in substantial transactions such as the regular Repo 105 transactions which involved billions in balance sheet exposure. The argument that breaking up banks into smaller units would harm the economy holds no water. Why should lending to industry, and in particular to middle-sized and smaller businesses be harmed if a bank can no longer play in - to pick just one example - the structured retail client product market in Germany?

Goldman's CDO Investors - were they stupid?

The CDO product at the center of the SEC's case against Goldman Sachs raises the question: were the 'sophisticated' investors (including ironically the middleman Goldman Sachs) that bought into this transaction stupid or victims (or both)? Leaving the legal and factual arguments for the moment out of the discussion - what was the motivation that caused the fund managers at IKB and ABN Amro to buy securities that were one or two steps removed from any real underlying economic transaction? Speaking from experience I can see them as busy, maybe even diligent people who were working in a set of parameters that prevented them from questioning certain assumptions at the heart of the structured product business: that securitised products contain what the label promises, that companies with a certain public image behave in a way that confirms this image, that all players on the field can be trusted to pursue goals that do not harm the other participants.
Securitisation in particular is critically dependent on trust as the buyers in effect must give a certain amount of leeway to the creator of the product they are purchasing. The whole business idea underlying securitisation is the fact that the buyer does not want to - or is not able to - to buy the underlying assets himself. In effect, he buys a packaged product and can never expect to fully analyse all the assets - would he do so he could as well purchase these assets directly thus disposing of the need for securitisation.

Betting on my neighbours house?

Lynn Stout's point about Goldman Sachs' Abacus Mortgage Derivatives Deal (New York Times) illustrates the need for stricter derivatives regulation:

"...much of the blame for investors’ losses in the Abacus deal can be laid at the feet of an obscure statute passed by Congress in 2000, the “Commodities Futures Modernization Act.”
If we allow the unscrupulous to buy fire insurance on other people’s houses, the incidence of arson would rise sharply. In one dramatic move, that act eliminated a longstanding legal rule that deemed derivatives bets made outside regulated exchanges to be legally enforceable only if one of the parties to the bet was hedging against a pre-existing risk."

Derivative Trading can be moved to Exchanges

While it has to be accepted that not all derivatives can be traded as standardised products the overwhelming majority could be accommodated on exchanges if a few simple modifications were made: in particular, the available expiration dates have to be frequent enough (monthly series) so that most requirements can be handled. Does a corporation really need to hedge interest rate risk to a date outside the available expiration cycles? We do not think that is necessary in the majority of cases. With sufficient incentive (different capital and accounting treatment in favor of listed derivatives) most companies would choose standard contracts. Concentration of activity in listed exchanges would create a tremendous increase in liquidity and this - in addition to much higher transparency in pricing - would lead to a snowball effect in favor of listed products. Would clearing houses be able to accommodate the rise in volume and consequent rise in risk in case one party should fail? This certainly could be a problem but at least the problem would be out in the open and not hidden in the (off)balance sheets of banks (usually in the footnotes). There they are posing the same level of risk but it is clear that the only guarantee in case of a failure of a counter party is the (implicit) guarantee by the taxpayer. A clearing system has to be designed to be robust enough to withstand any conceivable failure. This means sufficient margin collateral. Stress tests have to be designed so that even dramatic price changes like those experienced in the 1987 stock market crash of in the recent credit crunch pose no risk to the system.

P.S.: Today's article in The Times about disputed valuations concerning the sale of Lehman-related derivatives during a margin call illustrates that trading of derivatives on exchanges would create a more transparent pricing system.

Bruce Wasserstein: danger of star culture

Vanity Fair's portrait of Bruce Wasserstein confirms our long-standing suspicion that he was a brilliant deal maker - for himself. The 'bid them up' method of merger 'advice', the sale of his firm to a naive Dresdner Bank and his rapid departure afterwards should be a warning for any firm that tries to build its business on the shoulders of 'stars'.  It also illustrates the Peter Principle as most organisations have their share of senior managers who have outlived their usefulness.  In this respect it is curious that a large new office is constructed for Felix Rohatyn who is about to return to Lazard as a senior advisor. This brings back memories of another new office for a senior official in the dying days of the old Merrill Lynch. Could one say there is a 'New Office Syndrome' where a big ego needs a big office to feel safe and secure in its position?

Private Equity burns its fingers with BAWAG-PSK

News that the value of the stake in Austria's BAWAG-PSK bank that the private equity fund Cerberus bought in conjunction with an investor group may only be worth a quarter of the purchase price makes sobering reading. It demonstrates that overpriced acquisitions are not only the consequence of muddled thinking by the managements of established banks but can also lead the hard-nosed managers of private equity funds astray. While traditional managers are often seduced by the excitement of the hunt the fund managers may be pressurised by the need to put to work the money they have collected in the fund.   

How to control Commercial Property Lending

A report by the US Congressional Oversight Panel states that more than half of all outstanding commercial property loans are larger than the value of the underlying property highlight the need to reign in the banking system's freedom with respect to lending to commercial property. The report prompted us to submit the following comment to the Committee:

One often has to wonder how individual 'developers' can amass huge fortunes when most of them never had a shovel in their hand. A quick glance at the list of Billionaires in the Forbes list confirms that property development (and speculation) is an extremely profitable business for the few. A lot of this apparent success is due to the endless inflationary spiral during the post-war years, some is due to entrepreneurial spirit - but a lot is also due to lax lending practices (sometimes aided by dubious practices, the least pernicious being free tickets to sports events and meals in lavish restaurants provided to loan officers).
Reform should put strict limits on the loan value of any commercial property. At the same time 'interest only' loans should also be put under the spotlight. If they are deemed to be too risky for private homeowners they are even more risky in the hands of professional speculators and cannot be allowed to put the banking system under undue risk.

Risks - Higher rates and Creditor strike

All the financial and economic geniuses teaching Finance have forgotten that credit depends to a large extent on trust (lat. credere, to believe, trust in). Banks relying on buying in deposits, companies rolling over their commercial paper on a daily basis, countries buying off their voters with ever-increasing levels of borrowing all have to face the fact that when the music stops there might not be a chair left for them in the frantic scramble to replace maturing funds.
It is even more laughable to hear that Greece  claims (supported by many 'experts') that it cannot afford to pay interest rates of 6.5 or 7 per cent. I only can say, get real guys! Rates have been in double digits in the past few decades, and anyone thinking that this cannot happen again better wake up before it is too late. Interest rates do not have to reach extreme levels, but anything in the 5-7 per cent range, with a possible overshoot towards 8 or 9 per cent is in the realm of the possible. I used to say (well before the credit crunch!) that hardly anyone was prepared for a sudden shift in asset prices by 20 per cent. Little did I know that that was a conservative estimate in view what happened during 2007/09. Now I would warn all debtors to plan for higher rates.