UBS wants to take more risks says CEO Gruebel

Oswald Gruebel, himself a trader by background, says that UBS wants to take more risk in order to increase profits from Investment Banking. It remains to be seen how that strategy blends with the regulatory desire to reduce proprietary trading in banking. But risk in investment banking does not only mean positions (punts) taken by traders in bonds, equities, forex and commodities. It can also mean higher risk by lending (for higher margins) in commercial and investment banking. As such it is often disguised (even from the bank's management) and potentially more dangerous for that reason. But all banking is to some extent depending on taking (intelligent) risk and the change in strategy therefore is not necessarily an imprudent one. Execution and attention to detail - as always - is the key. On the other hand one would think that a truly global franchise such as UBS should make enough money from client-related business alone so that excessive risk taking is no longer required for the achievement of a satisfactory return on capital.

JP Morgan to acquire Brazilian Hedge Fund

It is not necessarily a logical consequence that banks that now are required by regulators to scale down their proprietary activities have to compensate for this by buying into hedge funds. Hopefully they do so if they expect to make a profit out of their stakes. But apart from the hefty price tags hedge fund businesses still attract, we think that adding to in-house asset management offerings runs counter to the tendency towards using 'open architecture' in asset management - and in particular with respect to the product selection for a bank's high net-worth and other retail clients.

Scandal of Lehman Bankruptcy Costs

The spiralling costs of related to the resolution of the 2008 Lehman bankruptcy can only be described as scandalous. Rather than worrying about how to make life for the banking and investing industry more difficult the regulators (in most countries) should pay attention to this little understood corner of the financial world. Similar abuse goes unchecked in ordinary bankruptcies as well were suppliers or creditors get short shrift from a dysfunctional and inbred community of 'bankruptcy professionals'. Assuming the average overall cost of a professional should be around $300,000 the costs that have been run up in the Lehman case so far ($982 million) would pay for the services of an army of just under 2000 professionals working exclusively on this case during the past 2 years. Any money squandered during this process leave investors worldwide out of pocket and therefore this is no game where no one is losing out. Where are legislators, regulators, the media or the corporate governance tribes to check the efficacy of the endless hours billed or the rates charged?