Betting on my neighbours house?

Lynn Stout's point about Goldman Sachs' Abacus Mortgage Derivatives Deal (New York Times) illustrates the need for stricter derivatives regulation:

"...much of the blame for investors’ losses in the Abacus deal can be laid at the feet of an obscure statute passed by Congress in 2000, the “Commodities Futures Modernization Act.”
If we allow the unscrupulous to buy fire insurance on other people’s houses, the incidence of arson would rise sharply. In one dramatic move, that act eliminated a longstanding legal rule that deemed derivatives bets made outside regulated exchanges to be legally enforceable only if one of the parties to the bet was hedging against a pre-existing risk."

Derivative Trading can be moved to Exchanges

While it has to be accepted that not all derivatives can be traded as standardised products the overwhelming majority could be accommodated on exchanges if a few simple modifications were made: in particular, the available expiration dates have to be frequent enough (monthly series) so that most requirements can be handled. Does a corporation really need to hedge interest rate risk to a date outside the available expiration cycles? We do not think that is necessary in the majority of cases. With sufficient incentive (different capital and accounting treatment in favor of listed derivatives) most companies would choose standard contracts. Concentration of activity in listed exchanges would create a tremendous increase in liquidity and this - in addition to much higher transparency in pricing - would lead to a snowball effect in favor of listed products. Would clearing houses be able to accommodate the rise in volume and consequent rise in risk in case one party should fail? This certainly could be a problem but at least the problem would be out in the open and not hidden in the (off)balance sheets of banks (usually in the footnotes). There they are posing the same level of risk but it is clear that the only guarantee in case of a failure of a counter party is the (implicit) guarantee by the taxpayer. A clearing system has to be designed to be robust enough to withstand any conceivable failure. This means sufficient margin collateral. Stress tests have to be designed so that even dramatic price changes like those experienced in the 1987 stock market crash of in the recent credit crunch pose no risk to the system.

P.S.: Today's article in The Times about disputed valuations concerning the sale of Lehman-related derivatives during a margin call illustrates that trading of derivatives on exchanges would create a more transparent pricing system.

Bruce Wasserstein: danger of star culture

Vanity Fair's portrait of Bruce Wasserstein confirms our long-standing suspicion that he was a brilliant deal maker - for himself. The 'bid them up' method of merger 'advice', the sale of his firm to a naive Dresdner Bank and his rapid departure afterwards should be a warning for any firm that tries to build its business on the shoulders of 'stars'.  It also illustrates the Peter Principle as most organisations have their share of senior managers who have outlived their usefulness.  In this respect it is curious that a large new office is constructed for Felix Rohatyn who is about to return to Lazard as a senior advisor. This brings back memories of another new office for a senior official in the dying days of the old Merrill Lynch. Could one say there is a 'New Office Syndrome' where a big ego needs a big office to feel safe and secure in its position?

Private Equity burns its fingers with BAWAG-PSK

News that the value of the stake in Austria's BAWAG-PSK bank that the private equity fund Cerberus bought in conjunction with an investor group may only be worth a quarter of the purchase price makes sobering reading. It demonstrates that overpriced acquisitions are not only the consequence of muddled thinking by the managements of established banks but can also lead the hard-nosed managers of private equity funds astray. While traditional managers are often seduced by the excitement of the hunt the fund managers may be pressurised by the need to put to work the money they have collected in the fund.   

How to control Commercial Property Lending

A report by the US Congressional Oversight Panel states that more than half of all outstanding commercial property loans are larger than the value of the underlying property highlight the need to reign in the banking system's freedom with respect to lending to commercial property. The report prompted us to submit the following comment to the Committee:

One often has to wonder how individual 'developers' can amass huge fortunes when most of them never had a shovel in their hand. A quick glance at the list of Billionaires in the Forbes list confirms that property development (and speculation) is an extremely profitable business for the few. A lot of this apparent success is due to the endless inflationary spiral during the post-war years, some is due to entrepreneurial spirit - but a lot is also due to lax lending practices (sometimes aided by dubious practices, the least pernicious being free tickets to sports events and meals in lavish restaurants provided to loan officers).
Reform should put strict limits on the loan value of any commercial property. At the same time 'interest only' loans should also be put under the spotlight. If they are deemed to be too risky for private homeowners they are even more risky in the hands of professional speculators and cannot be allowed to put the banking system under undue risk.

Risks - Higher rates and Creditor strike

All the financial and economic geniuses teaching Finance have forgotten that credit depends to a large extent on trust (lat. credere, to believe, trust in). Banks relying on buying in deposits, companies rolling over their commercial paper on a daily basis, countries buying off their voters with ever-increasing levels of borrowing all have to face the fact that when the music stops there might not be a chair left for them in the frantic scramble to replace maturing funds.
It is even more laughable to hear that Greece  claims (supported by many 'experts') that it cannot afford to pay interest rates of 6.5 or 7 per cent. I only can say, get real guys! Rates have been in double digits in the past few decades, and anyone thinking that this cannot happen again better wake up before it is too late. Interest rates do not have to reach extreme levels, but anything in the 5-7 per cent range, with a possible overshoot towards 8 or 9 per cent is in the realm of the possible. I used to say (well before the credit crunch!) that hardly anyone was prepared for a sudden shift in asset prices by 20 per cent. Little did I know that that was a conservative estimate in view what happened during 2007/09. Now I would warn all debtors to plan for higher rates.

Deutsche Bank puts $500 million into new Hedge Fund

It would be interesting to know if Deutsche Bank invests for its own account or its clients. If the former one wonders how that fits in with designs to de-risk the banking system and limit proprietary activities?

Can trust in Securitizations be revived?

The discussion about the feasibility of reviving the securitization business revolves to a large extent about how to ensure that investors can trust the integrity of the packaging process that is behind the creation of the securities backed by the underlying loans and mortgages. The concept of securitization from the buyer's perspective means that as an investor he gets access to a multitude of loans that are individually too small to be of interest (in the case of the institutional buyer) or too large (for a small retail investor). Both are unwilling or unable to conduct individual due diligence on every single underlying loan and in effect have contracted out the credit research to the institution that creates the loan bundle they are acquiring. 
While in an ideal world the 'free market' would take care of the problem of moral hazard and ensure that no loans of questionable value are sold or purchased we do agree that the requirement for packagers to retain a substantial stake in the securitized product is a sensible suggestion. While this may well raise to cost of the securitized package we think this is a price worth paying given the abuses that helped create the credit crunch of 2007-09.

Compensation vital cost factor

Over the years we have observed the rise and (more frequently) decline of many investment banks. As compensation is the key cost factor in the industry a sensible compensation structure is essential to achieving long-term success in the business. So when we read that the centuries-old private bank of Sal. Oppenheim had agreed to pay a former chief executive of Arcandor the princely sum of 4 million Euro a year for being an advisor (and on top of it give him a three-year contract) we were not surprised that the company had to be sold to Deutsche Bank. To throw around money like a drunken sailor can only end up with the business withering away due to lack of profitability. The situation at Lehman Brothers (and the old UBS before it was swallowed by Swiss Bank Corporation) was not dissimilar. The level of compensation was completely out of whack and while it may not have been the deciding factor in the demise of these enterprises it certainly was symptomatic for a general lack of good management and governance. Sensible recruiting is one - if not the - key factor in the success of a people business like investment banking - as well as in banking, securities brokerage and investment management. 

Global Banks need Global Regulation

The collapse of Lehman Brothers which had nearly 900 subsidiaries in around 20 jurisdictions demonstrates that financial institutions that want to be active on a global basis also need to be regulated on a global basis. The alternative has to be that each subsidiary is regulated on a watertight national basis (with its own capital requirements). Politicians and Regulators have to give a clear-cut response to the question what would happen if a globally-active bank with large operations in several countries gets into serious difficulties. As banks spread their wings wider and wider - see Banco Santander and Unicredit for example - an answer to this question becomes more and more urgent. Can their clients rely on the backing of their home country or is the government of the host country expected to write a blank cheque if the worst should happen? The case of the Icelandic banks should have been a wake-up call.

Reshaping US Mortgage Market

It beggars belief that a country that prides itself of its superior financial markets is not able to provide mortgages on a private basis. Apart from the fact that state-subsidised institutions may have distorted markets and driven out private-sector institutions it is amazing that a chastised banking industry prefers to pursue profits in more exotic segments of the financial markets rather than catering to the real needs of ordinary people.

Financial Reform (No) Progress Report

Politicians, regulators and industry representatives so far do not disappoint our (low) expectations. The main idea that seems to be gathering support is (surprise, surprise!) the introduction of more taxes. As usual the proceeds of the muted taxes are not going to be earmarked and will in due course be diverted to 'socially' worthy causes. 

One regulator behind each banker!

That is the ultimate destination of the effort to create regulation for a stable banking and financial system. It is the logic of central planning (and regulation is nothing else) that the rulebooks have to be more and more detailed to cover every eventuality. In order to be effective more and more decisions will have to be supervised in minute detail by an ever-rising army of regulators. Banking professionals may love this as the bureaucrat/regulator takes all responsibility for decisions from their shoulders as each and every decision would have to be approved. A useful side-effect may be the contribution this would make to the growning lack of employment opportunities in many Western countries as it would entail a doubling of employment in the financial service sector.

USA: desperate search to increase tax revenue

It is ironic that in a week when the helpless US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner pens a letter complaining about presumed unfair treatment of US alternative investment funds in the EU the US passes a law ('Foreign Tax Compliance Act') that forces all non-US financial institutions to report their dealings with US citizens. Against the background of a dysfunctional Congress and an administration that is spending money like a drunken sailor this desperate measure should not come as a surprise. The underlying philosophy is that a citizens' money really belongs to the state and it is up to the politicians to spend it. We do not expect the authorities to give a clear 'Njet' to this effort to extend the reach of US legislation one step further into other sovereign countries but it will do nothing to make it any easier for the US to fund its deficit in the future. Already some institutions have decided not to have any financial dealings in or with the US and as the next step may well be that the USA tries to help themselves to the wealth of non-US citizens we would advise investors to sponsor fund managers that take precautions for that eventuality.

FSA hellbent on destroying London as a financial centre

The FSA - which operates as a Quango with only the slightest amount of democratic oversight and legitimacy - intends to bring the number of paper-pushers to the incredible total of 3700 by the end of 2010. If one remembers that the City of London worked perfectly smoothly for centuries and well into the 1980s without any monstrous 'oversight' by bureaucrats the scale of this misdirection of taxpayer resources becomes more evident. When Lord 'Alliswell' clarifies that he considers much of financial market activity as 'economically' not useful he indirectly admits the intellectual bankruptcy of his thinking. To enter the debate about what is or is not 'economically useful' is a debate which only leads to the quicksands of moral do-goodism where some (usually self-appointed) authority tells other people what is good for them. The good Lord owes much of his status (and income!) to his being in favour with those in power and very little to him supplying 'valuable economic services' to the citizens. The savers in this country are those that really pay for the empire building activities of those behind the ever-expanding army of bureaucrats in the FSA. That all this spending will lead to the inevitable decline of the City of London as a financial centre is probably of no concern the the authorities. They may well talk the talk in favour of the City but one should watch what they are doing!

Deutsche Bank's Ackermann - danger of PR own goal

Deutsche Bank's Josef Ackermann fully deserves his 2009 compensation which puts him top-of-the-league for a DAX Chief Executive. It is still moderate compared with pay at some of his banking peers but it does not help his position in the global discussion about banking reform as 10 million Euro is still an amount that is way beyond salary levels that the public - and regulators, politicians and the media - feel comfortable with. To escape this dilemma it would be worthwhile to review the compensation structure of senior management - should it really be paid on the same basis as may be appropriate for a car salesman?

Bawag - problems of Private Equity or Hedge Fund Control

The diffuse ownership structure of the Austrian BAWAG Bank - where an alternative fund management firm has orchestrated a buy-out consortium a few years ago - is an apt illustration of the problems created by allowing alternative asset managers to control banking institutions. Apart from the fact that the financing often is debt-heavy there is the potential risk that conflicts of interest are not controlled properly. The age-old temptation of using a banking institution to supply credit on easy terms to controlling shareholders is one of the key areas that banking regulators have to focus on. There is also a potential conflict of interest when other banks (Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers in this case) are shareholders in competing institutions.

Barclays objects to Lehman scrutiny

Barclays Bank is on a roll and it therefore seems strange when the firm is reported to object to further disclosures concerning its takeover of the US operations of Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008. This behaviour will only encourage critics and runs contrary to our advice that full disclosure it the best public relations strategy.

Stability Fund no magic solution for Banking System

Germany seems to move closer to implementing some sort of stability fund for the banking sector. But its promoters already admit that the state (taxpayer) will still have to provide a backstop even in a situation when a fund is in existence. We would agree as the fund would have to be of enormous size if it ever would be able to provide for any crisis. Ironically a similar (simpler?) solution would be for banks to hold more capital reserves - which would effectively be an in-house contingency fund at every institution. Suggestions that other sectors (such as insurance) should also contribute to the fund are based on the argument that they have benefited from the bailout provided by the taxpayer. Now where does this argument end?

Lehman: Masters of the Universe R.I.P.

The sense of hubris that was prevalent at Lehman Brothers before the fall is well documented in a new book The Devil’s Casino: Friendship, Betrayal and the High Stakes Games Played Inside Lehman Brothers, by Vicky Ward. It mentions that one of the top honchos in the firm, Chris Pettit, got by with a personal spending budget of $ 15 million (!!) a year. With leadership of that kind it is no surprise that the company had to hit the rocks sooner or later. The question one has to ask is what lessons - if any - has the securities industry from the credit crunch?

Repo transactions under a cloud

Reports that Lehman relied heavily on repo transactions in order to disguise problems with its balance sheet highlight the need for tighter restrictions on repo's. Like commercial paper, most repo deals are short-term in nature and therefore unsuited for the financing of longer-term assets. Funding based on repo's, commercial paper and similar instruments should be used exclusively for the financing of assets with a matching maturity profile and capital requirements should allow for a sufficient margin to provide for extreme events.

Geithner intervenes in EU hedge fund regulation

One has to wonder what Tim Geithner's priorities are at a time when the USA faces an unprecedented gap in its budget and the economy has just left the intensive-care ward. The USA puts massive restrictions on foreign fund managers that try to market their services or securities to its citizens, the boilerplate restrictions on most securities prospectuses and fund manager's brochures and websites bear witness to that. Why should the EU not have the right to protect its citizens? Any non-EU fund manager is welcome to set up a EU-compliant subsidiary and thus get access to a market of 500 million people.

Causes of the global credit crunch

It is too early to fully understand how it could happen that the World's Financial System got close to a global meltdown during the past 12 months. Some blame greedy bankers, others lay the blame squarely at the foot of the (US) consumers. Institutional Investors also appear entangled as they allowed managements too much leeway and even egged them on to pursue ever-more risky expansion plans. However, we tend to think that regulators - and their paymasters the politicians - may have to take a large part of the blame.
Unfortunately they are the party that is the least likely to bear the full cost of their mistakes. Shareholders have to suffer from dramatically shrunken share prices, scores of bankers have lost their jobs, or are about to in the near future. Bureaucrats are happily engaged in the blame game and are joined by academics and media people who often are also less than objective in their judgement.

FSA wants tougher stress tests

As the FSA here in Britain announces new - tougher - stress markers for UK banks we can only hope that the underlying economic model holds up in case another economic crisis hits the banking system. We all know what happened to the Value-at-Risk Model - it was less than useful when it was needed most. The problem with stress-tests in banking is that it is impossible for the banking system as it is at present to provide for every conceivable disaster scenario as that would mean that ultimately the banks would have to hold all deposits 100 per cent in cash.

Lower Leverage-ratio under fire

The Federation of German banks has commissioned a study of the impact of stricter leverage ratios. Not surprisingly, the authors (Markus Rudolf and Michael Frenkel from WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management) come to the conclusion that the introduction of lower ratios would have to be handled very carefully - and may not even be desirable. To the contrary, we think that the suggested ratio of 20-25 times equity capital as a maximum range of leverage (as suggested in a consultation document presented by the Bale Committee last December) leaves the banking system still dangerously overextended.

Who needs rating agencies?

Warren Buffet certainly does not need them as he prefers to do his own analysis. We also suggest that investors do their own cooking. The only instances that makes ratings useful for investment decisions happen to be the situations where the consensus and/or ratings appear to cause a mispricing in the underlying security that allows a canny investor to benefit by taking the opposite side of the trade. As long as ratings are based on hard facts, usually numbers found in company accounts or data in national statistics, it is a simple matter of arithmetic to deduce the risk associated with a particular issuer. Where ratings rely on judgement calls they become highly subjective and should not be worth more than any other market opinion. Conflicts of interest exist when ratings agencies are given access to non-public information. As it is not possible for other investors to verify the information themselves, some lazy or naive investors get seduced to put excessive reliance on ratings decisions. This risk is exacerbated when laws or customs give ratings an official blessing - for example by requiring collateral posted with the European Central Bank to be of a certain credit quality testified by a rating.

Jon Corzine defending Goldman Sachs

One has to wonder what moral authority Corzine has to defend his former employer from what he calls 'envy'. A man who so blatantly makes a mockery of democracy by spending his vast wealth in securing himself public office should keep a low profile. Support of that kind is the last thing that Goldman needs given its image problems.

Warren Buffett on foolish acquisitions

In his 2009 Letter to Shareholders the sage from Omaha says it better than we ever could: many acquisitions are value-destroying.

Overpaying for Acquisitions

We were quite staggered by the prices some Western Banks paid when they acquired banks in 'high growth potential markets' in Eastern Europe or other Emerging Markets. Case in point is Austria's Raiffeisen that supposedly paid nearly Euro 1 billion for Ukraine's Bank Aval in 2005. This represented nearly two thirds of Aval's balance sheet. Similarly high multiples were shelled out by other banks while we continuously advised that it would make more sense to plough the money into organic expansion. After all, the banks that were acquired were themselves only built up over a short time-span nor had they proven themselves through the business cycle.

How to regulate Derivatives

Warren Buffett famously described Derivatives as Weapons of 'Financial mass destruction' (2002 Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway). While we think that this catchy phrase exaggerates the dangers of derivatives it has to be accepted that these contracts are essentially bets similar to futures contracts. As they are highly leveraged - in contrast to futures contracts there often is no margin at all - and no money may change hands when the initial contract is signed they are susceptible to outright fraud or abuse by overambitious traders and financiers. We would like to add to the debate by suggesting that all forms of derivatives are subject to meaningful margin requirements (including capital requirements in balance sheets of banks, insurance companies, corporations and public entities).

Goldman and Greece: Barron's pullls no punches

Barron's Magazine is traditionally a magazine that defends free markets and capitalism. So it comes as a surprise when the Editorial Comment has a go at Goldman Sachs and Wall Street firms in general. When a stalwart of the business community like Barron's and not some leftist publication starts to call them 'Wall Street casino sharks' (sic) is it not time that these firms start to listen and change their business models?

Poor Defense of Speculation

Darrell Duffie tries to revive well-worn arguments (Wall Street Journal, 24 Feb 2010) in defense of unrestrained speculation and does a disservice to free markets by leaving the door open for anti-market regulators. As a Stanford University professor one would expect him to show more awareness that certain speculative activities may well require more regulation in order to allow the rest of the financial markets to function without attracting counterproductive over regulation. Speculation may well serve a useful purpose - some times, maybe most times, but not always. For example, if speculators are allowed to buy insurance on my house (and even hire someone to burn it down in order to cash in on the insurance) then things have gone too far. But that threat exists when there is unrestricted speculation in short selling of shares, CDS contracts and distressed debt.

The Donkey and BNP Paribas

Watching CNBC I could hardly believe my eyes when I spotted a middle-aged French lady rattling on about her life, that she dreamed of being rich when she was young. This was quickly followed by a rustic-looking chap from the West Bank who told us how happy he was to feed his donkey. The suspense built and I thirsted for the commercial break on CNBC to end so that I could find out which company was willing to shell out money for such incoherent testimonials. I expected it to be some charity, maybe linked to the United Nations. But the surprise winner was -- BNP Paribas! Having just closed today's Financial Times where a back page was adorned by the picture of Roger Federer it made it all-too-obvious that advertising has taken on a life of its own in the banking industry. Is it really all about image? Is it impossible to differentiate yourself by promoting a better product and outline the benefits it may bring to the customer? Does it really matter to a customer of Credit Suisse how many matches Roger Federer may have won? (650 in case you wonder). At a time when banking worldwide is an industry under siege - and we may not yet have seen the worst of the political onslaught - one would hope that managements put their advertising departments on a tighter leash.

Fraud Prevention - Banks walk on thin Ice

News that a subsidiary of Nord LB (Norddeutsche Landesbank) in Switzerland may have fallen victim to a fraud in its trade finance activities that may cost it up to Euro 130 million is a timely reminder that banking is a hazardous business where a premium should be put on credit and operational supervision and due diligence. All-too-often senior management is preoccupied with 'strategy' or political infighting and pays little or no attention to what is going on further down in the organisation or in outposts of a far-flung (overextended?) empire.

BNP Paribas Compensation: A Model to follow?

BNP states that is will reduce its compensation-to-income ratio to 27 per cent for FY 2009. In doing so management claims to address public (political) concerns over excessive pay. BNP certainly seems to navigate successfully through the twin challenges of keeping regulators sweet and running the business smoothly while competitors stumble over PR gaffes or management mistakes. However, we do have a sneaking suspicion that pressure on compensation levels in the large investment banks will contribute to a revival of smaller competitors that are not in the limelight and are less subject to regulatory fervor.

Goldman Sachs Business Principles

We still have the last edition of Goldman's phone directory that we received before moving on.

Point 1 states: Out clients' interests always come first. Our experience shows that if we serve our clients well, our own success will follow.

Point 2: Our assets are people, capital and reputation. If any of these are ever lost, the last is the most difficult to regain.

We hope that these points still feature prominently in the phone directory (which by now will probably be in electronic form only).

Greece: Why not declaring bankruptcy?

Martin Feldstein's piece in yesterday's Financial Times (Let Greece take a holiday from the Eurozone) caused us to send him a brief note and we will watch the reply of the sage with interest:

Dear Mr. Feldstein!

Your article - like most other articles concerning the Greek Debt Saga - tacitly assumes that one simple way to solve the problem is not feasible: a declaration of bancruptcy and subsequent resolution comparable to Chapter XI in the USA.

At present, the only two options that are being discussed are (1) a bailout by EU member states or (2) Greece leaving the Eurozone. Eliminating the option of bancruptcy from consideration creates an unproductive stalemate between two diametrically opposed viewpoints (aften aggravated by different ideologies regarding the philosophy behind the creation of the Euro).

Harmonised Stress Tests - Good in Theory

CEIOPS plans to introduce a harmonised stress test for Insurance companies in Europe. While this is a worthwhile project it will create one practical problem: what amount of stress will be applied to the balance sheets of the insurers? Well before the Credit Crunch started in the middle of 2007 we often asked the question: What would happen in the hypothetical case that all asset prices drop 20 per cent? would the banking and financial system in general be able to withstand such a shock - given that the margin of safety on a lot of lending was much less than that! We all know the answer to that question and I think that lessons still have not been learned. The problem is, that only by relying less on debt and debt instruments (in any form) and more on equity will the risk of a financial meltdown be successfully contained. Regulators will be hard-pressed to set the appropriate level of 'stress' in any test - too much and they regulate the insurance industry out of business, too little and the test becomes meaningless.

Barclays Results - how good?

We are not running a financial research business but every so often we are tempted to comment on a company result when we can use it to pinpoint some interesting development in our patch - banking, securities and money management. The one detail that caught our interest in the Barclays results was the fact that actual return on shareholder's equity seems to be below the 10 per cent mark. While this is a respectable number - is has been produced during the second part of the Credit Crunch at a time when the sizable Lehman USA acquisition had to be digested - it puts into perspective the fact that the banking giants produce headline catching numbers (total compensation paid out, profits earned) but this has to be seen in proper perspective. Making that kind of return with a lot of tailwind from financial markets and ultra-cheap central bank money is no superhuman feat. Any new costly regulation may well put downward pressure on banking profitability in the future.

Greece: Banks and Hedge Funds must watch out

The present crisis in and about Greece may look like a god-sent opportunity to make money but banks and hedge funds must be careful not to take too high a profile. Speculation against the Euro and Greece may well backfire if it turbo-charges downward pressure on the Euro and Greek bonds. The days when speculation was a cottage industry and could be ignored are long a thing of the past. Speculative moves do not reflect reality but they actually CREATE reality (a thankful nod to George Soros' theory of reflexifity). So this is not a harmless crap game but the lives of millions of citizens are at stake - and they will not tolerate for ever that a few make millions on the back of ordinary working people. Recent criticism (James Rickards in last week's Financial Times and today's Neue Zuercher Zeitung) pointed the finger at Goldman Sachs. But its competitors should not gloat but may well find themselves in the firing line as well. The New York Times points out that the same investment banks that now point the finger at Greek profligacy when they issue their research reports were more than willing to lead the country deeper into the debt trap. Can you really have it both ways? Even with the help of God?

Bank Tax: Brown barking up the wrong tree

When statists sniff an opportunity to extract more tax from their subjects they usually find an excuse quite quickly. Gordon Brown certainly thinks that the solution to all of our problems is to invent a new tax. So it is no wonder that taxing banks is his solution to the global credit crunch. How that is supposed to absolve us from problems such as excessive borrowing, mismatch of maturities in balance sheets or simply bad lending is not explained to the public. In addition we have to expect the worst when it comes to disposal of the loot: will the tax money end up in some sort of reserve fund? or is it a pay-as-you-go scheme like the national 'insurance' or unemployment 'insurance' schemes that we are so familiar with?

EU Alternative Asset Management Regulation

The present plan to regulate the alternative asset management industry in the EU suffers from a number of serious deficiencies: Number one is the lack of a definition of the problem that it is supposed to solve. If there is no problem it is quite tough to design a proper regulatory regime. As far as we can see, apart from the usual rant from social engineers to the left (but also the authoritarians on the right) of the political divide there has not been a convincing proof that hedge funds or private equity funds pose a serious problem to anyone individually or to 'society' in general. So we are left with a legislative 'free-for-all' that gives underemployed and overpaid bureaucrats that represent no one but themselves (and their prejudices) carte blanche to cook up more schemes to make it difficult for ordinary citizens to make a living. As there is no clearly defined problem in the first place it is impossible to pass judgement whether or not the proposed measures are appropriate - an ideal world for the legislators as no one can call them to account or do a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed legislation. (As if anyone would to that in Brussels or any other capital). On the most basic level a major criticism has to be that it is not sensible to regulate hedge funds and private equity funds in the same law. They are similar in nature but it takes a bit of experience to understand that they are two very different animals. We rest our case as it is impossible to convince the average EU bureaucrat that he is barking up the wrong tree. Better to prepare for the wholesale decampment of the alternative investing industry to friendlier shores!

UK: is regulation 'clinically insane'?

The regulation may not be clinically insane (as per Jon Moulton) but it certainly requires a special individual to be able to find one's way through the thousand plus pages of the assorted rules and regulations passed by the FSA. One wonders how many of its staff would pass an exam that tests them about detailed knowledge of all the rules, - we would take bets that the present chairman would not be able to pass the exam. We do not even want to get into the question of democratic accountability as the British Parliament is not fit for the purpose it is designed for. There is no 'talk' (french: parler) as the stooges peopling its benches are basically told what to nod through by the government.

Capital Ratios still at pathetic levels!

There is still more talk than action in banking reform. Volcker rule, Basel III, contingent capital - all these buzzwords are worthless if nothing gets implemented at some stage. News of generous bonus pools give the impression that all is back to normal in the banking world but when we had a look at the capital ratios of some large banks we were genuinely surprised - if not shocked - about the abysmal capital ratios that some of them reveal. Balance sheet totals seem to expand and the simple ratio of pure equity is in the low single-digits, and falling!

Santander to float Bradford & Bingley?

It is just a bit over one year that the shareholders of B&B got expropriated by the British Government and saw control of the business handed over to Banco Santander shortly afterwards. So it may ruffle a few feathers among the investor community if there is talk that Banco Santander may float a stake in Bradford & Bingley or some other holdings in the UK on the public markets here. While Santander appears to be the laughing third party in this sorry affair one would hope that the effort of the previous owners of B&B to get satisfaction in the courts gets a boost from this slap in their face. After all, the situation at B&B cannot have been all that bad. Forensic accountants to the fore! And what about all that talk about 'Human Rights'?

AIG: Compensation Policy in Disarray

News that Peter Hancock is joining AIG with a compensation package worth up to $ 7.5 mio per year drives another nail through the credibility of the Obama administrations attempts to control pay in the financial sector - and in particular in the companies dependent on government support.

Apology to Wall Street

Just how strong the Anti-Wall Street feeling is can be seen from this article on - of all places - Marketwatch. Is it not time that someone listens? (or is everyone AWOL in Davos?)

Austria: Back to the Past

Austria demonstrates that political control of banking institutions by no means assures that banks are managed in a responsible fashion. Numerous banking problems during the past 30 years (Laenderbank, Bawag, Kommunalkredit, Bank Burgenland) prove this point. The most recent example of a bank that was the plaything of politicians and got into trouble while the regulators turned a blind eye is the Hypo-Alpe-Adria Group in the southern province of Carinthia. The bank had to be rescued by the Federal Government in December 2009 and to cap it all two members of the political establishment have now been appointed to the supervisory board. Plus ca change....

Michael Mayo Testimony - Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission January 2010

Nobody has the time to read everything of relevance - but occasionally we like to the highlight little gems such as Michael Mayo's testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.

Banking Reform - 2009 a year of lost chances

News that the former CEO of AIG, Hank Greenberg, is trying to have the regulators and politicians look into the circumstances of the bailout of AIG in the autumn of 2008 is just one symptom that the after-effects of the 2008 banking crisis will be with us for quite some time. Most of the ongoing problems can be traced back to the fact that bail-outs were executed in an arbitrary fashion devoid of any principle and in addition there was no democratic oversight. At least the citizens of Iceland have a say in the (non)payment of the bailout money they are asked to contribute to. In the past year there has been zero progress towards creating a banking system that does not explicitly or implicitly rely on future bailouts by the taxpayers. We are not confident that 2010 will bring more progress.