31 Dec 2010
Central Clearing: Solution or Problem?
M+A: Success ratio lower than at Russian Roulette
30 Dec 2010
Compensation gravy train: one train in the UK that you can rely on!
29 Dec 2010
Patchy hiring to follow frenzy at European banks says Reuters
Tulips anyone?
Deutsche Bank: rated most exposed by Japanese Regulator
15 Dec 2010
UBS dress code memo
13 Dec 2010
Deutsche Boerse: another Euro 450 mio written off on ISE
12 Dec 2010
Secretive Banking Elite rules Trading in Derivatives?
Goldman Sachs in controversy about CDS trade
11 Dec 2010
Deutsche Bank set to leave Postbank alone after merger
9 Dec 2010
Extensive interpretation of race discrimination by UK courts
6 Dec 2010
Goldman to write down stake in CMC Markets
4 Dec 2010
Some simple rules for banking reform - and no need for a PhD either!
2 Dec 2010
Regulatory costs out of control
FSA vetting procedures - deepening bureaucratic morass
1 Dec 2010
No improvement in pay practices at banks - study
23 Nov 2010
Lehman bankruptcy administration costs reach $1 billion mark
22 Nov 2010
Kafka alive and well in US Government
11 Nov 2010
Troubled Borrowers should not be treated too leniently
9 Nov 2010
Staff Performance Reviews under Fire
8 Nov 2010
Pitfalls of Acquisitions
7 Nov 2010
Bankers need to find bonus accord?
6 Nov 2010
How to protect bankers from themselves
3 Nov 2010
BBVA acquires 24.9 % stake in Turkey's Garanti Bank
Basel III - 'Dangerous Nonsense' - discriminates against small banks
31 Oct 2010
UBS wants to take more risks says CEO Gruebel
28 Oct 2010
JP Morgan to acquire Brazilian Hedge Fund
20 Oct 2010
Scandal of Lehman Bankruptcy Costs
14 Oct 2010
UBS - enterprise culture blamed for credit desaster
Frankfurt no serious competition for London
12 Oct 2010
Buyer's remorse over signing-on payments
9 Oct 2010
Joaquin Almunia - what does he know about banking?
29 Sept 2010
Goldman versus Matt Taibbi - PR Battle looms
More pessimism about outlook for investment banking
16 Sept 2010
A distorted view of the banking crisis
14 Sept 2010
Should Malta and Latvia merge?
Staff could sue if discriminated by customers
How to define Prop Trading
13 Sept 2010
Investment Banking Jobs in Danger?
12 Sept 2010
No one helps Bank analyst Bove in hour of need
But if his claim that several associations that represent stock analysts or the securities industry declined his requests to help him pay his legal bills it leaves a sour taste in the mouth - to say the least. What use are the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the New York Society of Security Analysts and the CFA Institute if they decline to make a stand for independent investment research. To cap it all, they declined to comment when approached by the New York Times. Even worse - the investment bank Ladenburg Thalmann, his then employer, chose to settle its end of the case by paying BankAtlantic $350,000, without admitting to any wrongdoing, and leaving Mr. Bove to defend himself. We are glad to report that Bove won his court case against the Bank but is still left with legal bills totalling $800,000. The stakes in a case like this are high as any successful lawsuit against an analyst would deter critical analyst comments in the future and stifle independent research.
11 Sept 2010
Investment Banking: tough to make it pay
10 Sept 2010
FSA fines Goldman Sachs $31 million
9 Sept 2010
Masters of the Universe: Memento Mori!
8 Sept 2010
Barnier: get out of Europe, fast!
7 Sept 2010
Banking Reform: Tinkering leads to bureaucratic monster
6 Sept 2010
Sauve qui peut!
4 Sept 2010
US sanctions akin to tolls exacted by robber barons
HSH Nordbank: Management plays power games
2 Sept 2010
FACTA: Will the EU stop US power grab?
A Stalinist Approach to Banking
28 Aug 2010
Cash bonuses reduce risk - Study
27 Aug 2010
Musings of a Hedge Fund Manager
Bank Capital should be 13 pct - Basel Committee
24 Aug 2010
Image Campaigns - do they make sense for Banks?
Image Campaigns may well have a role to play for banks that are active in the mass market but for banks that are mainly involved in the institutional or high networth market a more focused approach must be the preferred route.
23 Aug 2010
Who should regulators be accountable to?
2 Aug 2010
Pay rules: Bureaucratic nightmare in the making?
The average employee has zero influence on the overall risk profile and financial performance of his employer. A small circle of top managers is wholly responsible for the success of any enterprise in our system of corporate governance and any major delay in paying the much-needed pay-checks to staff further down the rung will only massively demotivate staff - and in many cases make them willing to consider a move to friendlier shores.
26 Jul 2010
Verdict on Dood-Frank bank reforms
"Based on sound-thinking courageous judgement, the Glass-Steagall legislation was only 17 pages long. Packed with wheezes and loop-holes, Dodd-Frank runs to 2,319 pages. Enough said"
14 Jul 2010
Limits to Vulture Funds?
6 Jul 2010
Goldman cannot separate Derivative Profits
We can only assume that some information got lost on the way from the FCIC to the reporter as we can not imagine that at a time when computing power is so abundant it would not be possible to separate the profitability by product - down to the P&L of each individual transaction.
4 Jul 2010
Re-Recruit your team every day
Lagarde: Stress tests will show EU banks healthy
8 Jun 2010
Germany: Compliance Madness
27 May 2010
Banking: Maturity Mismatch continues
26 May 2010
FSA behaves like a traffic warden
25 May 2010
Bank Chief: Savers should lose in bank failure
24 May 2010
Dubai debt settlement leaves sour taste
Banks are still allowed to play in Private Equity?
Abacus CDO Deal: Moral Equivalency
Neo-Feudalism will kill London Financial Centre
23 May 2010
Financial Non-Reform in the US
SEC: non-report on 1000 point drop in Dow Jones
8 May 2010
Client or Counterparty?
To ask for full disclosure from a securities dealer would be like asking a Bond Street jeweler to disclose the production cost of the latest Rolex watch and 'advise' the customer on the merits of the purchase.
7 May 2010
Goldman PR counterattack: Risking Overkill?
6 May 2010
Derivative Clearinghouse no magic Bullet?
Hedge Fund Wolves destroyed Bear Stearns?
30 Apr 2010
Private Equity Investment in Banks poses Risk
27 Apr 2010
Credit Derivatives: Ban speculative Buyers of 'Protection'
Goldman most powerful Bank?
23 Apr 2010
Lacking CDO Disclosure: Who is to blame?
Bank Reform: Ban on non-bank business
Financial Reform: rejoinder to Ferguson and Forstmann
"Wrong, Wrong, Wrong! The three goals CAN be addressed at the same time, it just depends on how you define the words depression economy, bail out and efficient capital markets. All these terms leave plenty of room for discussion (and disagreement). Bail-outs can be done in a phased way for example, first wipe out the shareholders (and management options and restricted stock), then impose haircuts on bondholders and large depositors. Assuming that banks in the future will face tighter regulation (limits on maturity mismatch, higher capital ratios, limits on risks by industry, geography, limits on prop trading, no non-bank investments such as hedge funds or private equity) bail-out costs will be more calculable. With respect to 'efficient' capital markets we give just one aspect where there may be disagreement with respect to an appropriate definition -does an efficient capital market have to include the ability to trade share in nano seconds at the expense of the broader investing public? Reforms are possible that leave us with capital markets that are sufficiently 'efficient' to finance business and industry."
22 Apr 2010
Financial Reform Bills - the case for democratic reform
When financial reform bills are 1273 and 1336 pages long as in the case of bills that have been passed or debated by the US Congress one can only say that this is legislation run amok. I would not expect a single member of congress to pass a simple multiple choice exam about the content of these bills and as a consequence one has to assume that a lot of nonsense is being passed that will hardly improve the situation for investors or taxpayers in the country. What is demonstrated by this perverted legislative process is the need to reign in overbearing and/or incompetent governments and parliamentarians. Anyone interested in how to bring this change should visit www.dirdem.org
Fabrice Tourre: Goldman's sacrificial lamb?
21 Apr 2010
IMF - full of bureaucrats and tax dodgers
Disclosure no safeguard against deception
20 Apr 2010
What is socially useful work?
Glass Steagall is good for you!
Dick Fuld's Ignorance: argument for smaller Banks
Goldman's CDO Investors - were they stupid?
The CDO product at the center of the SEC's case against Goldman Sachs raises the question: were the 'sophisticated' investors (including ironically the middleman Goldman Sachs) that bought into this transaction stupid or victims (or both)? Leaving the legal and factual arguments for the moment out of the discussion - what was the motivation that caused the fund managers at IKB and ABN Amro to buy securities that were one or two steps removed from any real underlying economic transaction? Speaking from experience I can see them as busy, maybe even diligent people who were working in a set of parameters that prevented them from questioning certain assumptions at the heart of the structured product business: that securitised products contain what the label promises, that companies with a certain public image behave in a way that confirms this image, that all players on the field can be trusted to pursue goals that do not harm the other participants.
Securitisation in particular is critically dependent on trust as the buyers in effect must give a certain amount of leeway to the creator of the product they are purchasing. The whole business idea underlying securitisation is the fact that the buyer does not want to - or is not able to - to buy the underlying assets himself. In effect, he buys a packaged product and can never expect to fully analyse all the assets - would he do so he could as well purchase these assets directly thus disposing of the need for securitisation.
18 Apr 2010
Betting on my neighbours house?
Lynn Stout's point about Goldman Sachs' Abacus Mortgage Derivatives Deal (New York Times) illustrates the need for stricter derivatives regulation:
"...much of the blame for investors’ losses in the Abacus deal can be laid at the feet of an obscure statute passed by Congress in 2000, the “Commodities Futures Modernization Act.”
If we allow the unscrupulous to buy fire insurance on other people’s houses, the incidence of arson would rise sharply. In one dramatic move, that act eliminated a longstanding legal rule that deemed derivatives bets made outside regulated exchanges to be legally enforceable only if one of the parties to the bet was hedging against a pre-existing risk."
14 Apr 2010
Derivative Trading can be moved to Exchanges
While it has to be accepted that not all derivatives can be traded as standardised products the overwhelming majority could be accommodated on exchanges if a few simple modifications were made: in particular, the available expiration dates have to be frequent enough (monthly series) so that most requirements can be handled. Does a corporation really need to hedge interest rate risk to a date outside the available expiration cycles? We do not think that is necessary in the majority of cases. With sufficient incentive (different capital and accounting treatment in favor of listed derivatives) most companies would choose standard contracts. Concentration of activity in listed exchanges would create a tremendous increase in liquidity and this - in addition to much higher transparency in pricing - would lead to a snowball effect in favor of listed products. Would clearing houses be able to accommodate the rise in volume and consequent rise in risk in case one party should fail? This certainly could be a problem but at least the problem would be out in the open and not hidden in the (off)balance sheets of banks (usually in the footnotes). There they are posing the same level of risk but it is clear that the only guarantee in case of a failure of a counter party is the (implicit) guarantee by the taxpayer. A clearing system has to be designed to be robust enough to withstand any conceivable failure. This means sufficient margin collateral. Stress tests have to be designed so that even dramatic price changes like those experienced in the 1987 stock market crash of in the recent credit crunch pose no risk to the system.
P.S.: Today's article in The Times about disputed valuations concerning the sale of Lehman-related derivatives during a margin call illustrates that trading of derivatives on exchanges would create a more transparent pricing system.
13 Apr 2010
Bruce Wasserstein: danger of star culture
11 Apr 2010
Private Equity burns its fingers with BAWAG-PSK
9 Apr 2010
How to control Commercial Property Lending
One often has to wonder how individual 'developers' can amass huge fortunes when most of them never had a shovel in their hand. A quick glance at the list of Billionaires in the Forbes list confirms that property development (and speculation) is an extremely profitable business for the few. A lot of this apparent success is due to the endless inflationary spiral during the post-war years, some is due to entrepreneurial spirit - but a lot is also due to lax lending practices (sometimes aided by dubious practices, the least pernicious being free tickets to sports events and meals in lavish restaurants provided to loan officers).
Reform should put strict limits on the loan value of any commercial property. At the same time 'interest only' loans should also be put under the spotlight. If they are deemed to be too risky for private homeowners they are even more risky in the hands of professional speculators and cannot be allowed to put the banking system under undue risk.
8 Apr 2010
Risks - Higher rates and Creditor strike
It is even more laughable to hear that Greece claims (supported by many 'experts') that it cannot afford to pay interest rates of 6.5 or 7 per cent. I only can say, get real guys! Rates have been in double digits in the past few decades, and anyone thinking that this cannot happen again better wake up before it is too late. Interest rates do not have to reach extreme levels, but anything in the 5-7 per cent range, with a possible overshoot towards 8 or 9 per cent is in the realm of the possible. I used to say (well before the credit crunch!) that hardly anyone was prepared for a sudden shift in asset prices by 20 per cent. Little did I know that that was a conservative estimate in view what happened during 2007/09. Now I would warn all debtors to plan for higher rates.
3 Apr 2010
Deutsche Bank puts $500 million into new Hedge Fund
30 Mar 2010
Can trust in Securitizations be revived?
While in an ideal world the 'free market' would take care of the problem of moral hazard and ensure that no loans of questionable value are sold or purchased we do agree that the requirement for packagers to retain a substantial stake in the securitized product is a sensible suggestion. While this may well raise to cost of the securitized package we think this is a price worth paying given the abuses that helped create the credit crunch of 2007-09.